

Same dream, different ambitions: Charles de Gaulle's Europe and Jean Monnet's Europe in the 1960s.

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〈Abstract〉

This study examines and compares the visions of de Gaulle and Monnet for Europe, considering both their shared aspirations and perceived differences. Both figures played significant roles in shaping European international relations throughout the 20th century, but their portrayals often diverged. De Gaulle is often characterized as a nationalist figure, while Monnet is often revered as 'the Father of European Integration'. While the prevailing narrative emphasizes the divergences between De Gaulle and Monnet, it is important to acknowledge that they shared the same dream of a strong Europe built upon a strong France. Both de Gaulle and Monnet recognized the necessity of European integration in maintaining European peace, addressing the 'German Problem' after World War II, and creating a strong and independent Europe. However, they differed significantly in their approaches to constructing Europe, particularly in terms of methods, institutions, and relationships with the United States. These differences often resulted in conflicts between the two leaders, especially regarding the issue of British participation in the EEC and the Europe-United States relationship. By comparing de Gaulle's Europe to Monnet's Europe, this study aims to enhance our understanding of their contributions to European integration and shed light on the

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complex motivations and ambitions that influenced their visions of Europe.

Key words: European Integration, Charles de Gaulle, Jean Monnet, Supranationality, Atlanticism.

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I. Introduction

In the Pantheon, two French heroes rest side by side: Charles de Gaulle, the national hero who twice rescued the French people from crises, and Jean Monnet, widely recognized as one of the key architects of European Integration. Both figures lived during the same era: Monnet was born in 1888 and de Gaulle in 1890. And they played significant roles in shaping European international relations throughout the 20th century. However, their portrayals often diverged. De Gaulle is often characterized as a nationalist figure, while Monnet is celebrated for his European vision. In the collective memory, de Gaulle and Monnet are seen as representatives of opposing conceptions of Europe. The prevailing narrative tends to emphasize the divergences between de Gaulle and Monnet. However, it is important to acknowledge that despite their differences, both de Gaulle and Monnet shared the same dream of a strong Europe built upon a strong France.¹⁾ This study

1) German historian Wilfried Loth has argued that by solely emphasizing the opposition between Monnet and de Gaulle, there is a risk of overlooking the extensive phase of

examines and compares the visions of de Gaulle and Monnet for Europe, considering their shared aspirations and perceived differences.

De Gaulle's actions were often seen as conflicting with the goals of European integration. De Gaulle is known in the history of European Integration for two significant events: his rejection of Britain's membership into the European Economic Community (EEC) and the French withdrawal from the Council of Ministers, which led to the "empty chair crisis" of 1965-66. These actions led to de Gaulle being perceived as a figure who destabilized European Integration. From the perspective of European integrationists, de Gaulle's insistence on prioritizing the nation-state undermined the progress of the European Community (EC) during the 1960s and hindered its institutional advancement until the implementation of the Single European Act in 1986 and the Treaty on the European Union in 1992. Consequently, de Gaulle was commonly viewed as an obstacle to the progress of further integrated and cohesive European projects.

However, Desmond Dinan offers a different perspective on this issue. He emphasizes that although de Gaulle's actions may have appeared contradictory to European integration, he actually played a crucial role in safeguarding the EEC during its formative years. Specifically, de Gaulle achieved this by rejecting a British proposal for a rival free trade area (FTA)² and sticking to the schedule for implementing the customs union in the 1960s. According to Dinan, de Gaulle's support for the EEC was motivated by its potential to achieve significant French economic objectives, such as modernizing industries and subsidizing agriculture.³

cooperation between the two. Wilfried Loth, "Jean Monnet, Charles de Gaulle et le projet d'Union politique(1958-1963), in Bossuat Gérard & Wilkens Andreas, (sous la direction de), *Jean Monnet , l'Europe et les chemins de la paix* (Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999), p.357.

- 2) The term 'Free Trade Area' (FTA) was adopted as the title of an important European co-operation project, which was launched by the British in 1956, but which had failed by 1959.
- 3) Having regained power in 1958, de Gaulle aimed to utilize the EEC as a means to position France as a leading force in cultural advancements within European civilization.

Additionally, de Gaulle actively pursued the establishment of the 'Fouchet Plan,' an intergovernmental organization for foreign and security cooperation. He also envisioned the European Community as a possible foundation for an independent Europe, free from U.S. influence. Laurent Warloutzet, a French historian, corroborates Dinan's claim, emphasizing de Gaulle's pivotal role in the failure of the FTA and the success of the EEC. Warloutzet even goes as far as suggesting that de Gaulle could be seen as a new "Father of Europe."⁴⁾ Taking into account the perspectives of Dinan and Warloutzet, it becomes clear that de Gaulle's contribution to European integration cannot be simply dismissed as negative.⁵⁾ These explanations underscore the significance of conducting a comprehensive and balanced examination of de Gaulle's approach to European integration.

On the other hand, Monnet played a significant role in advocating for European integration, focusing on reconciling France and Germany and implementing a supranational management system for the coal and steel industries. His visionary approach and dedicated efforts were widely celebrated, as he contributed significantly to the resolution of conflicts and the promotion of peace in Europe during the initial phases of European integration. As a result, Monnet is often revered as 'the Father of European Integration.' However, British historian Alain

His objectives included forming alliances for French defense, boosting the country's economic growth within the European framework, and projecting French influence globally through the establishment of a European organization, particularly the Common Agricultural Policy(CAP). de Gaulle's overarching goal was to shape the EEC according to his own vision, prioritizing French economic interests and fostering a Europe that could rely on itself. About this viewpoint, refer to Desmond Dinan, *Origins and Evolution of the European Union* (Oxford University Press, 2006), pp.83-123.; Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration* (Lynne Rienne, 1999), pp.37-56.

- 4) Laurent Warloutzet, de Gaulle as a Father of Europe: the unpredictability of the FTA's Failure and the EEC's Success (1956-58), *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Nov., 2011), pp. 419-421.
- 5) The view that de Gaulle pursued European integration in his own way differs slightly from the common belief that he hindered its progress. This aspect requires more academic discussion for better clarity.

Milward argues that Monnet, much like de Gaulle, was motivated by France's national interests in his pursuit of European integration. Milward highlights that Monnet faced the challenge of reconciling Franco-German relations to ensure France's long-term security, while also giving priority to the country's national reconstruction efforts. As a solution, Monnet proposed the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), aimed at jointly managing Germany's coal and steel industry.⁶⁾ Milward concludes that the primary objective of the ECSC, devised by Monnet and presented by Schumann, was to provide France with access to critical German resources and markets, which were indispensable for its own reconstruction endeavors.⁷⁾

Such an explanation goes beyond the narrow evaluation of Monnet's actions and ideas solely as the 'father of European Integration' or as an 'Europeanist' opposed to nationalism. Milward's argument emphasizes the significance of European Integration in rescuing France from the post-war crisis. In other words, the development of European Integration was strongly motivated by the concept of 'national interests' or 'national strategies.'⁸⁾ Monnet's statement, "Without a strong France, a strong Europe and a peaceful Europe cannot coexist,"⁹⁾ can be

6) According to Milward, Monnet began to see the resources of Germany, particularly coal, as a potential substitute that could aid in the expansion of French steel production, a crucial element of his plan known as the Monnet Plan for Modernization and Equipment. During the years 1946 and 1947, Monnet regarded Germany as instrumental in the planned reconstruction of France. Alain S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (Routledge, 1992), p. 335. There are several primary sources that corroborate Milward's assertion regarding Monnet's recognition of the significance of Germany's coal resources for France and the European economy. The following examples serve as illustrations of this viewpoint. Foundation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe (hereinafter referred to as FJME) AME 57: Le problème du charbon, de l'Acier et du Pétrole.; FJME AME 57/1/179: Notes of a conversation between Mr. Monnet and Mr. Clayton (24.09.45); FJME AME 57/1/208 : "Note sur la production du charbon allemande", de Jean Monnet à C. de Gaulle, G. Bidault, R. Pleven, Lacoste, R. Mayer (03.11.45); FJME AME 57/1/138 : Télégramme de J.M. à R. Pleven et Lacoste (18. 07.45).

7) Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, pp.333-336.

8) Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, pp.16-20.

understood in this argument. Monnet's numerous documents reveal the link between France's considerations of its foreign policy towards Germany in 1949 and the development of the Schuman Plan in 1950.¹⁰⁾ Georges Berthoin, a French politician and diplomat, said that just as Christopher Columbus discovered America while searching for a route to the Indies, Monnet discovered Europe while seeking to serve France in resolving the 'German question.'¹¹⁾ Therefore, it can be concluded that, like de Gaulle, Monnet took into consideration French interests in the context of European integration.

In a word, Both de Gaulle and Monnet aimed to construct a robust Europe with the condition of a strong France at its core. But they envisaged a different Europe. While both de Gaulle and Monnet shared a vision for Europe's future, their views on how to achieve it were fundamentally different. De Gaulle believed in a Europe where national sovereignties were preserved and guided by French inspiration, with France as the dominant power in European foreign policy. In contrast, Monnet advocated for a Europe based on anti-nationalism and concrete institutions, which would require a decline in the power of individual states and nations. These differences can largely be explained by their vision and action in international relations. Nowadays, the differing political approaches of de Gaulle and Monnet in the construction of European integration are explained by two political theories: intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. These two approaches continue to play a significant role in the current process of the European Union. This study aims to compare de Gaulle's vision of Europe to that of Monnet, analyzing their viewpoints to better understand their contributions to European integration and the disparities

9) FJME AME 33/1/3: Une note de Jean Monnet (05.08.43).

10) FJME AMG 5/1/3: Note de réflexion de Jean Monnet (28.04.50).; FJME AMG 5/1/5: Note de réflexion de Jean Monnet (03.05.50) [note confidentielle].

11) [Entretien] : L'héritage de Jean Monnet, entretien avec Georges Berthoin réalisé par Eric Roussel, *Revue des Deux Mondes* (2021), p. 59. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44193335>; Wolf D. Gruner, "La Place de l'Allemagne dans l'europe d'après-guerre selon Jean Monnet (1940-1952)," in Bossuat Gérard & Wilkens Andreas, *Jean Monnet, l'Europe et les chemins de la paix*, pp.113-146.

between them.

II. Literature review on the comparative study of de Gaulle's Europe and Monnet's Europe.

The study comparing de Gaulle's and Monnet's conceptions of Europe originated with the work of the French historian Jean Baptiste Duroselle, who lived contemporaneously with both figures. Duroselle described the lives and contributions of these two men. According to him, de Gaulle and Monnet were approximately the same age. De Gaulle, a skilled army lieutenant from Lille, actively fought in the World War I and was wounded near Dinant. On the other hand, Monnet, due to his poor health, was unable to serve in the military and instead sold his father's cognac in Canada and England when World War I broke out. De Gaulle saw World War II as connected to the 'Grandeur' (greatness) of France, while Monnet regarded the crisis of the war as a chance for close collaboration among allies. In essence, de Gaulle aimed to re-establish the French state, while Monnet dedicated himself to promoting cooperation between European states during the war. After the war, de Gaulle continued to emphasize 'La Grand France,' while Monnet worked towards the construction of Europe.¹²⁾ Duroselle insisted that the two men's vastly different backgrounds led to differing visions for the future of France and Europe during the two World Wars.

François Duchêne, who was Monnet's former collaborator and biographer, described the divergent attitudes of Monnet and de Gaulle towards European economic unity during World War II. In October 1943, Monnet discussed his vision of a united Europe with de Gaulle during their meeting in Algeria.¹³⁾

12) Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, "General de Gaulle's Europe and Jean Monnet's Europe," *The World Today*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Jan., 1966), pp.1-13.

13) André Kaspi made an excellent contribution to Monnet's mission and activity in Algiers;

Monnet's proposal for a united Europe to de Gaulle was based on three main principles: equality among member states, the establishment of a single economic entity with free trade, and international authority over the coal and steel industries. However, de Gaulle expressed skepticism, questioning the feasibility of French and Germans belonging to the same economic union.¹⁴⁾ They had conflicting views on how closely France and Germany should work together. Duchêne's interpretation of de Gaulle's skepticism suggests a fundamental gap between the two men's views on Europe and the future of the nation-state. Although they both grappled with similar issues, such as Germany and freer trade, their contrasting perspectives anticipated the later tensions that emerged between them. In brief, during the war, while de Gaulle aimed to re-establish the French state as a dominant power, Monnet emphasized the importance of establishing equal relationships between European states.

Regarding the construction of Europe, as Duchêne rightly pointed out, from the summer of 1943, Monnet continued to stress the importance of establishing an 'equal relationship without winners or losers between France and Germany after the war.' In several documents from that time, he suggested that peace could not be achieved through feelings of discrimination or superiority.¹⁵⁾ In these documents,

refer to André Kaspi, *La Mission de Jean Monnet à Alger*, Mars–Octobre 1943 (Publication de la Sorbonne, 1971). According to Kaspi, Monnet arrived in Algiers as an envoy of President Franklin Roosevelt in early 1943 and played a key role in persuading General Giraud to merge his movement with the Gaullists, thus unifying French resistance. Monnet also facilitated negotiations between Giraud and the rival leader of the Free French, General Charles de Gaulle. During this time, Monnet met with de Gaulle and discussed European economic unity and the future of the nation-state. And Duchêne provides a detailed account of the meeting and communication between Monnet and de Gaulle in Algeria in 1943. Francois Duchêne, *Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence* (London: Norton, 1994), pp.126-146.

14) Duchêne, *ibid.*, p. 127.

15) The papers called "The Reflexion of Algiers" are the following: FJME AME 33; Réflexion sur l'Europe d'après-guerre.: FJME AME 33/1/1: Notes de réflexion de Jean Monnet "Le développement de la guerre est tel..." (05.08.43); FJME AME 33/1/7: "Un relèvement national aussi rapide que possible étant le but à atteindre..." (08.10.43);

Monnet emphasized the importance of treating Germans equally when the economic unification of Europe would eventually take place. During a conversation with Robert Schuman in 1950, Monnet mentioned that the Treaty of Versailles' ingrained discrimination and superiority had prevented the attainment of peace in 1919. On the other hand, de Gaulle's vision of Europe emphasized independent nation-states with no supranational authority, where France would be the dominant power in foreign policy. Summarizing the arguments presented by Duroselle and Duchêne regarding de Gaulle and Monnet's differing vision for Europe, de Gaulle and Monnet had different backgrounds, and their visions for Europe were quite distinct from each other. De Gaulle's vision was to re-establish the French state as a dominant power in Europe, while Monnet's vision was to create a cooperative and integrated European community, with a focus on concrete political institutions rather than nationalistic ideals.

French historian Pierre Gerbet offers a precise response to these distinctions. According to him, de Gaulle had a classical conception of European history. He believed that the State and the Nation, along with their traditional organization, were the crucial factors.¹⁶⁾ So, de Gaulle disagreed with the idea of a Europe governed by a supranational authority, which was a vision that Monnet strongly advocated. Instead, de Gaulle envisioned a Europe where national sovereignties would be preserved and guided by French inspiration. Essentially, he wanted France

FJME AME 33/2/11: "Je considère comme admise l'idée de faire l'Europe..." (20.08.43); FJME AME 33/2/12: "Les conditions dans lesquelles la France sortira de la guerre..." (23.08.43); FJME AME 33/2/14: "L'organisation politique et économique de l'Europe occidentale" (La date n'est pas identifiée). In these documents, Monnet emphasized the importance of equality in international relations and highlighted that peace could not be achieved through discrimination and notions of superiority. He drew upon his experience with the Treaty of Versailles after World War I and concluded that peace built on inequality would not yield positive outcomes.

16) Indeed, de Gaulle is often perceived as a strong nationalist, particularly in comparison to figures like Valéry Marie René Giscard d'Estaing, who was seen as a federalist and a supporter of European unity, and François Mitterrand, who was regarded as a key figure in European Integration.

to be the dominant power in European foreign policy.¹⁷⁾ While de Gaulle believed in the importance of the State and the Nation, Monnet rejected nationalism, which he saw as promoting inequality. Unlike de Gaulle, Monnet placed less emphasis on a specific geographic area and instead focused on building a set of political institutions to create a new, anti-nationalist Europe. He believed that achieving this vision required a reduction in the power of individual states and nations. As a result, the approaches of these two grand figures to European integration were vastly different.

After his self-imposed political exile since resigning as the leader of the first postwar government in 1946, de Gaulle returned to French politics in 1958. Despite his earlier criticisms of European integration initiatives such as the ECSC and EDC in the early 1950s, de Gaulle's views on the importance of building Europe seemed to align with those of Monnet after his return to power. Contrary to his previous opposition, de Gaulle did not object to the establishment of the EEC. According to Hungdah Su, he actively contributed to the launch of the CAP and emphasized the need for a 'Europe of States', leading the construction of a political Europe.¹⁸⁾ This means that in the 1960s, de Gaulle not only advocated for European economic integration but also for European political integration. How can we best explain de Gaulle's changing attitude and direction toward the European Integration?

De Gaulle's approach to European integration has been analyzed from two perspectives: traditional and revisionist.¹⁹⁾ The traditional view suggests that de

17) Pierre Gerbet, Jean Monnet-Charles de Gaulle : Deux conceptions de la construction européenne, in Bossuat Gérard and Wilkens Andreas, *Jean Monnet, l'Europe et les chemins de la Paix*, pp.413-421.

18) Hungdah Su, *Jean Monnet face à la politique européenne du général de Gaulle de 1958 à 1969* (Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 1998), pp.212-213.

19) The debate surrounding de Gaulle's policy towards the European Economic Community (EEC) is commonly divided into two camps: the traditionalists and revisionists. This dichotomy is widely used in the literature, including N. Piers Ludlow's book "*Globalizing de Gaulle*". Most historical accounts of French European policy in the 1960s still take the

Gaulle's policy towards the EEC was shaped by geopolitical and ideological factors, similar to those that influenced French military, nuclear, and alliance policies. These factors include France's desire for sovereignty and independence in international affairs, as well as its historical tensions with Germany and other European powers. On the other hand, the revisionist view argues that de Gaulle's primary motivation for his policy towards the EEC was driven by economic interests. Revisionist scholars claim that de Gaulle saw the EEC as an opportunity to protect and promote French economic interests, including safeguarding French agriculture and industry from competition and ensuring access to markets for French exports. According to this perspective, de Gaulle's actions and decisions within the EEC were guided by his desire to maximize economic benefits for France.²⁰⁾

To comprehend de Gaulle's position on European integration, it is essential to examine his actions during the 1960s. During this period, de Gaulle pursued several significant aims, such as advocating for the CAP, supporting the 'Fouchet Plan',

traditional view, which suggests that French EEC policy was driven by the same motivations as France's policies toward NATO and nuclear weapons at the time. The traditional view posits that de Gaulle's unique geopolitical "grand design" aimed to enhance French sovereignty, military power, and diplomatic prestige. This interpretation is discussed in several chapters of *"Globalizing de Gaulle,"* including Garrett Martin's conclusion, Carine Germond's chapter on the Franco-German partnership, and James Ellison's chapter on Anglo-French rivalry over NATO policies. Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher, and Garret Martin, eds., *Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958– 1969* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), pp.291–308. In contrast, revisionists interpret de Gaulle's motivations differently, arguing that his primary motivation behind the decision to join the EEC was to promote the welfare of powerful French industrial and agricultural constituencies. For this revisionist interpretation, sources such as Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*; Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* (Cornell University Press, 1998); Frances Lynch, *France and the International Economy: From Vichy to the Treaty of Rome* (London: Routledge, 1997). For an example of his more recent revisionist phase, see N. Piers Ludlow, "From Words to Actions," in Nuenlist, Locher, and Martin, eds., *Globalizing de Gaulle*, pp.63–84.

- 20) Andrew Moravcsik, "Charles de Gaulle and Europe: the New Revisionism," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 14, No.1 (Winter 2012), pp.53-77.

vetoing British membership in 1963 and 1967. These actions were driven by de Gaulle's primary objectives of strengthening France's status as a 'Great Power', enhancing its prestige, transcending blocs, avoiding subordination, and consolidating French leadership in Europe. Notably, de Gaulle's evolving attitude towards European integration in the 1960s was closely tied to France's relationship with the United States. de Gaulle was concerned about American influence in Europe. He feared that American dominance within the EEC would compromise France's sovereignty and weaken its position on the global stage. Therefore, de Gaulle advocated for a Europe of States, where each member state would have equal power and influence, rather than a Europe dominated by supranational institutions. This approach was aimed at enabling France to maintain its independence and protect its interests within the EEC.

It is widely acknowledged that de Gaulle had a strong desire for an independent Europe, one that was free from the influence of the United States. One of the reasons he opposed Britain's entry into the Common Market was due to the special relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States. De Gaulle believed that the U.S. sought to maintain its dominance over Europe.²¹⁾ Instead, he envisioned an independent Europe that would serve as a 'third force.' On December 31, 1964, he rejected any systems that compromised this vision under the guise of supranationality, integration, or Atlanticism. On the other hand, Monnet sought a strong partnership between the European Community and the United States. He did not conceive of Europe as a 'third force' between the United States and the Soviet Union but strongly believed in Atlantic solidarity.²²⁾ As Pierre Gerbet

21) De Gaulle's suspicion regarding the United States can be traced back to his meeting with Roosevelt at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943. The Casablanca Conference, which took place in Casablanca, French Morocco, from January 14 to 24, 1943, aimed to devise the Allied European strategy for the upcoming phase of World War II. The primary participants were US President Franklin Roosevelt, accompanied by his military staff, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, accompanied by his staff. Stalin was unable to attend the conference. Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, General de Gaulle's Europe and Jean Monnet's Europe, *The World Today*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Jan., 1966), p.6.

explains, the fundamental disagreement between de Gaulle and Monnet centered on their contrasting views on American engagement in Western Europe. De Gaulle criticized Monnet's concept of 'Atlantic Europe' and instead advocated for a 'Europe of European States.' The crux of their disagreement stemmed from their distinct conceptions of American involvement in Western Europe and their differing outlooks on Atlantic partnerships.²³⁾

In conclusion, after a thorough review of previous studies, it is evident that both de Gaulle and Monnet held similar views on the significance of constructing Europe from 1958 when de Gaulle returned to power. This similarity exists even though de Gaulle had previously criticized European integration. They both recognized the significance of organizing Europe for the purpose of peace, German integration, and economic progress, benefiting the European countries situated between the two superpowers. However, significant differences emerged between them in terms of how to construct Europe. They diverged considerably in their approaches to the methods, institutions, and relationships with the United States. These differences became more pronounced in the 1960s, particularly regarding their perspectives on transatlantic relations. According to René Girault, the conflicts between the two men went beyond the simple contrast between de Gaulle's vision of a Europe based on national identities and Monnet's belief in the benefits of supranational. The most profound disagreement was in the nature of the relations between Western Europe and the United States, and the concept of Atlanticism.²⁴⁾ Therefore, in order to compare their conceptions of European integration, it is crucial to understand their divergent perspectives on Atlanticism in the 1960s.

The comparison of de Gaulle and Monnet's conceptions of European construction cannot be limited to broad generalizations and a static perspective

22) Pierre Gerbet, Jean Monnet-Charles de Gaulle: Deux conceptions de la construction européenne, in Gérard Bossuat and Andreas Wilkens, *Jean Monnet*, p.416.

23) *Ibid.*, p. 411.

24) René Girault, "Interrogations, réflexions d'un historien sur Jean Monnet, l'Europe et les chemins de la Paix," in Gérard Bossuat et Andreas Wilkens, *ibid.*, p.19.

(such as a narrative of Europeanism versus Atlanticism). These conceptions have evolved over time, taking into account the circumstances and the individual situations of both figures. During the Fourth Republic, de Gaulle, in opposition, strongly criticized a European policy that was largely influenced by Monnet. However, under the Fifth Republic, when de Gaulle was in power, he sought to assert his own vision of Europe. On the other hand, Monnet envisioned an Atlantic Europe that would include Great Britain and allow for equal partnership with the United States. He believed that by working together with the United States, Europe could effectively tackle global challenges. Therefore, in order to fully grasp these conceptions of Europe, it is necessary to examine them within their respective contexts and consider the historical evolution that shaped them.

III. Two conceptions of the European Integration: de Gaulle's Europe and Monnet's Europe, 1958–1967.²⁵⁾

1. De Gaulle's Europe

When de Gaulle returned to power in 1958, Europe was very different from the one in 1946 when he had resigned from the presidency of the provisional government. The Atlantic Alliance had been created and was deeply integrated. The

25) Regarding a comparison between the two individuals, refer to Jean-Baptiste Duroselle's work "Deux types de grands hommes : le général de Gaulle et Jean Monnet" in Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *Itinéraires, idées, hommes et nations d'Occident (XIXe-XXe siècles)* (Publication de la Sorbonne, 1991), pp.243-260; Wilfried Loth, Jean Monnet, Charles de Gaulle et le projet d'Union politique (1958-1963), in Gérard Bossuat-Andreas Wilkens, (eds.), *Jean Monnet, l'Europe et les chemins de la Paix*, pp.357-367; also see Pierre Gerbet, "Jean Monnet-Charles de Gaulle. Deux conceptions de la construction européenne" in the same publication, pp.411-433; refer to Hungdah Su's thesis as well as Michel Albert's "Souvenir de Jean Monnet" in *Témoignages à la mémoire de Jean Monnet* (Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, 1989), pp.25-27.

initial steps of European integration had been taken with the creation of the ECSC and further solidified with the Treaty of Rome. During this period, de Gaulle recognized the importance of international cooperation due to advancements in communication, increased trade, the rise of regional blocs, and growing economic interdependence. Despite his strong opposition to the ECSC, the EDC, and other supranational forms of integration, de Gaulle was not completely hostile toward the European Community. He even welcomed the outcome of the Treaty of Rome because European construction was essential and an integral part of his grand vision for Europe. He did not want to put an end to this construction, but rather to steer it in his own direction. Essentially, he was in favor of European integration as long as it could strengthen France and, at the same time, be controlled by Paris.²⁶⁾ However, his approach to European integration initially clashed with the stance taken by Britain.

The United Kingdom consistently chose not to participate in European structures and institutions that could potentially undermine its sovereignty, a stance evident from the early stages of European integration, from the ECSC to the Treaty of Rome. In reality, Monnet, from the beginning of his presidency in Luxembourg, proposed a close and enduring association between the European Coal and Steel Community and the United Kingdom, characterized by shared rules and responsibilities that went beyond mere trade or consultation agreements.²⁷⁾ However, the British government took its time to respond to Monnet's proposal, and as a result, they rejected the idea of supranational cooperation. Initially, when invited to join the Spaak Committee at the Messina Conference in 1955, the British expressed significant interest, appointing the Under-Secretary of State for Trade as their representative in the initial discussions. However, as plans for Euratom and the customs union materialized in November 1956, the United Kingdom concluded that

26) Hungdah Su, *Jean Monnet face à la politique européenne du général de Gaulle de 1958 à 1969*, p.139.

27) FJME AMH 71/2/8: Lettre de Jean Monnet à un Ambassadeur (18.10.52).

participation was not feasible. According to Pierre Gerbet, the primary reason for the British refusal toward the Common Market was their existing membership in a customs union with the Commonwealth countries, which offered advantageous trade terms while safeguarding their political independence.²⁸⁾ Regarding this matter, Robert Marjolin, a former collaborator of Monnet and a member of the French delegation in the negotiations for the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1955, specifically stated:

"What troubled the British government a great deal during the negotiation of the Treaty of Rome was agriculture. They had no interest in incorporating agriculture and were resistant to making any changes to their existing agricultural system. This was a fundamental concern for them. [...] They also desired the freedom to continue unrestricted global trade, particularly with the Commonwealth. The provisions we were seeking to include in the treaty for the common agricultural policy would not have been well received by them."²⁹⁾

Instead, Harold Macmillan, who was the Prime Minister and also the President of the OECD(The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) Council at the time, proposed the establishment of an industrial free trade zone among the OECD countries. The idea was for each country to gradually eliminate its customs barriers in favor of other OECD member countries while maintaining a customs policy towards countries outside the OECD. In the end, the United Kingdom refused to join the Common Market and instead sought to establish itself as an autonomous entity within the broader free trade zone.

As a result, tensions between the Common Market and the larger Free Trade Zone escalated following the negotiations of the Treaty of Rome. During the discussions at the OECD on the Free Trade Area from spring 1957 to December

28) Pierre Gerbet, *La construction de l'Europe* (Notre Siècle, 1983), pp.233-234.

29) "Interview de Robert Marjolin par Roberto Ducci et Mme Maria Grazia Melchionni le 24 septembre 1984." in *La Genèse des Traités de Rome: Entretiens inédits avec 18 acteurs et témoins de la négociation*, (FJME, 2007), p.326.

1958, the division between France and England grew even stronger. In a note to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on November 6, 1958, de Gaulle expressed his concerns about the French government being confronted with overwhelming demands that it was unable to fulfill.³⁰⁾ In London, Selwyn Lloyd, who served as Foreign Secretary under Prime Minister Anthony and Harold Macmillan, described the situation as a disaster, stating it was the most critical stage of Anglo-French relations since June 1940.³¹⁾ France accused England of aiming to dismantle or impede the functioning of the Common Market. Furthermore, Maurice Couve de Murville, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, rejected the idea of a free trade area without agriculture, a common external customs barrier with the same rates, or any early economic union.³²⁾ On the other hand, the British believed France was trying to maintain its traditional policies using the Common Market. Agriculture consistently remained at the center of the conflict and tension between de Gaulle and Britain. This conflictual phenomenon was highlighted by various economic newspapers, including *Business Week*, an American economic journal:

"Western Europe is split today into two economic camps. On the one side is the six-nation Common Market (European Economic Community), which is all set to start functioning Jan. 1. On the other side is a second group of six nations that have just failed in an attempt to attach the proposed Free Trade Area to the Common Market. This economic clash has been building up for months, with France and Britain constantly quarreling as the respective

30) DE-CE, 1945-1960, 754, Présidence du conseil, Paris le 6 novembre 1958, note pour le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Cabinet, cite in Gérard Bossuat, *L'Europe des français 1943-1959* (Éditions de la Sorbonne, 1997), p.390.

31) Ministère des Affaires étrangères Cabinet du ministre, M. Couve de Murville, et d'entretiens, 1958, vol 282, conversation Selwyn Lloyd, Couve de Murville, Maudling, Londres, 6 novembre 1958, cité par Gérard Bossuat, *ibid*.

32) In December 1958, after gaining West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's support, French President Charles de Gaulle vetoed British proposals for a free trade area (FTA) outright. Andrew Moravcsik, "de Gaulle Between Grain and Grandeur: The Political Economy of French EC Policy, 1958-1970 (Part 2)," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Fall, 2000), p.4.

champions of the Common Market and the Free Trade Area.[...]"³³⁾

Conflicts between de Gaulle and Britain escalated between 1960 and 1962, primarily centered on the potential expansion of the EEC and Great Britain's inclusion in the Common Market. Moravcsik, an expert in politics and international affairs, offers an comprehensive explanation for de Gaulle's rejection of British involvement, particularly concerning agricultural matters.³⁴⁾ According to Moravcsik, de Gaulle vetoed British membership primarily because he anticipated that Britain, with its distinct domestic agricultural structure, would likely obstruct generous funding for the CAP. De Gaulle regarded economic issues as crucial, as he believed that a legitimate European Community required a common tariff and agricultural preference. Above all, he feared that British membership would undermine and dismantle the CAP. Thus, de Gaulle staunchly opposed British influence, driven by a strong commitment to safeguarding French control and protecting France's agricultural interests. These concerns played a central role in de Gaulle's assessment of British membership.

Apart from the agricultural issue, it is widely believed that de Gaulle's hostility towards Britain, more than any other factor, was driven by geopolitical interests that shaped his European policy. De Gaulle frequently spoke of conflicts between the French and the Anglo-Saxons, depicting Britain as a "Trojan horse" and expressing concerns about 'American dominance.' These metaphors reflect de Gaulle's opposition to British membership, which was rooted in his geopolitical ideas regarding France's role in the postwar world. De Gaulle firmly believed that British inclusion would introduce American influence into Europe, posing a major obstacle to his vision of a 'European Europe' led by France. Above all, de Gaulle's vision was driven by a strong determination to prioritize France's greatness. The special relationship between Britain and America was at the heart of his concerns. He

33) FJME AMK C 23/9/24: "Trade Unity Splits West Europe; Time for a Push Toward Unity," Article (*Business Week*), (06.12.58)

34) Moravcsik, "de Gaulle Between Grain and Grandeur: pp.4-68.

feared that if Britain took the lead, the European Community could evolve into an 'Europe of the United States.' De Gaulle openly expressed these views during the aforementioned press conference on January 14, 1963, in France.

"England, being an island country, is different from the European continent. If the UK were to join the EEC, it would be required to modify the existing system due to these differences, potentially weakening the cohesion among member states. Moreover, Britain's heavy reliance on the United States could ultimately lead to Europe becoming an Atlantic community under American leadership."³⁵⁾

To understand de Gaulle's decision, it is important to recognize that his vision for Europe was rooted in preserving France's independence. After experiencing the humiliation of war, post-war dependence, and colonial setbacks, it is understandable that de Gaulle prioritized national sovereignty as the key to achieving greatness. Stanley Hoffmann points out that this concern for national sovereignty resonated with any French person who lived through the difficult years of occupation and its aftermath.³⁶⁾ De Gaulle's vision of *grandeur* revolved around the concept of

35) The following video sources present de Gaulle's opposition to Britain's participation. Charles de Gaulle paroles publiques, Conférence de presse du 14 janvier 1963 (sur l'entrée de la Grande-Bretagne, <https://fresques.ina.fr/de-gaulle/parcours/0005/de-gaulle-et-les-etats-unis.html> (Accessed: 2023.06.01); Conférence de presse de Charles de Gaulle par Yves Courrière (RTL, 14 janvier 1963) https://www.cvce.eu/obj/conference_de_presse_de_charles_de_gaulle_par_yves_courriere_rtl_14_janvier_1963-fr-6e48abec-7fbc-4b8b-8b87-399afaf708ea.html (Accessed: 2023.06.01); Conférence de presse de Charles de Gaulle sur l'adhésion du Royaume-Uni aux Communautés européennes (16 mai 1967) https://www.cvce.eu/obj/conference_de_presse_de_charles_de_gaulle_sur_l_adhesion_du_royaume_uni_aux_communautes_europeennes_16_mai_1967-fr-646f41cc-dc02-46f2-9cce-2296c2d19a3e.html (Accessed: 2023.06.01); Conférence de presse de Charles de Gaulle: le second veto (27 novembre 1967) http://www.cvce.eu/obj/conference_de_presse_de_charles_de_gaulle_le_second_veto_27_novembre_1967-fr-d47637f7b66c-44a7-8cff-2b6b45c53424.html (Accessed: 2023.06.01)

independence. He believed that true greatness for France could only be attained through asserting its sovereignty, strengthening its military capabilities, and exerting influence in international diplomacy. De Gaulle firmly held the belief that France should be a strong and sovereign nation, capable of shaping its own destiny on the global stage. By the way, the inclusion of Britain in the EEC posed a significant challenge to realizing this vision, as de Gaulle firmly believed that the United States aimed to maintain its dominance over Europe and the world through Atlantic cooperation. From de Gaulle's perspective, the integration of the United Kingdom into the EEC was a crucial issue in Atlantic cooperation. Consequently, he strongly opposed Britain's entry into the community, perceiving it as an obstacle to France and Europe's pursuit of independence.

In summary, de Gaulle's approach to European integration in the 1960s goes beyond the simplistic dichotomy of Europeanism versus Atlanticism. It is crucial to understand the diplomatic considerations and national interests of France that influenced his policy. His stance on European integration was shaped by a combination of economic and geopolitical factors, particularly in relation to agricultural policies and his strong opposition to Britain's entry into the EEC. These tensions can be traced back to 1958, and throughout the 1960s, de Gaulle consistently opposed closer relations with Britain, vetoing a proposed free trade area, terminating negotiations, and rejecting British participation in the EEC. By comprehending the multifaceted motivations behind de Gaulle's politics of European integration, we can gain a deeper insight into the complexities and nuances of his approach.

36) While some have compared his foreign policy approach to Napoleon or Louis XIV, de Gaulle's inspiration can also be traced back to the Jacobin tradition. Stanley Hoffmann, "De Gaulle, Europe, and the Atlantic Alliance," *International Organization*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (winter, 1964), pp. 1-2.

2. Monnet's Europe.

When comparing de Gaulle's vision of Europe to Monnet's, a significant difference becomes apparent in their perspectives on Atlanticism. Specifically, Monnet's concept of Europe was closely associated with Atlanticism, as he sought to establish an 'Atlantic Europe' that could exist alongside the United States and work together on global challenges. Monnet frequently expressed that: "Global issues cannot be resolved without America's participation, yet they also cannot be resolved by America alone."³⁷ In 1954, he began to recognize the need for a strong connection between the Six (nations) Community, England, and the United States through the ECSC, understanding the importance of these alliances for their harmonious coexistence. Following the rejection of the European Defense Community (CED) and amidst a crisis in Europe, Monnet adopted two distinct approaches. On one hand, he sought to advance European integration by fostering a comprehensive Franco-German understanding, establishing a European federation that would safeguard French privileges. On the other hand, he advocated for an integrated Atlantic Alliance where all nations would be treated equally, with the goal of strengthening European defense.³⁸ These approaches were rooted in pragmatism.

Monnet constantly considered American-European relations as his Atlantic partnership project took shape.³⁹ When confronted with de Gaulle's firm stance

37) FJME AMK, 103/1/29: Note de Jean Monnet (28.09.59).

38) DDE (Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Eisenhower Library) 47, John Foster Dulles, Series-General Correspondence, Box 3 (File M "4"), Letter (Jean Monnet to John F. Dulles), (19.10.54).

39) Monnet's interactions with American elites between 1954 and 1963 shaped his concept of Europe, leading to the emergence of an 'Atlantic partnership'. Douglas Brinkley, "Dean Acheson and Jean Monnet: On the Path to Atlantic Partnership," in Clifford P. Hackett (ed.), *Monnet and the Americans: The Father of a United Europe and His US Supporters* (Washington, DC: Jean Monnet Council, 1995). Monnet preferred the term 'Atlantic partnership' over the term 'Atlantic Community.' Duroselle, *General de Gaulle's Europe and Jean Monnet's Europe*, p.10.

against Britain, Monnet's initiatives, such as the Atlantic Partnership between the United States and Europe, became more determined, and he conveyed this idea to President Eisenhower.

"A partnership between the United States and a United Europe. These objectives would be the basis on which it would be possible to build up a long term understanding between Russia and the West that might one day become an association. As for Britain, since she does not wish for the moment to join a United Europe ought to deal with both America and her on the same footing of close cooperation."⁴⁰⁾

Finally, on July 27, 1959, Monnet proposed the establishment of an 'Atlantic economic association,' envisioning a prosperous and developed economic entity within the European Community that would participate in an Atlantic economic association.

"The moment had come to reassess all the mechanisms that the major industrial powers on both sides of the Atlantic had put in place for their economic cooperation. [...] the creation of the Common Market signifies the emergence of a 'second America' within the Western community."⁴¹⁾

Monnet wanted to develop transatlantic cooperation through the project of an 'Atlantic economic association.' His goal was to create a united Atlantic world where trade issues between Europe and North America would be collectively addressed. He stated. "Europe, having regained its economic health, is now the time to take a new Atlantic initiative, based on the sincere acceptance that the trade problems of Europe and North America are common problems and should be treated as such."⁴²⁾ Monnet firmly believed that the time was ripe for a new phase in Atlantic

40) DDE 23, President's personal Files-Series box 61 (File 1-F-38-France), personal letter (Jean Monnet to D.D. Eisenhower), (14.08 59)

41) FJME AMK 103/1/16: Une ère nouvelle dans les relations atlantiques (27.07.59).

42) FJME AMK 103/1/16: Une ère nouvelle dans les relations atlantiques (27.07.59).

relations, highlighting the importance of shared economic interests between America and Europe.⁴³⁾ In contrast to de Gaulle's stance, Monnet consistently advocated for the European Community to strengthen its ties with the United States. He actively pursued an Atlantic economic association starting in 1959 and proposed transforming the OEEC into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in 1960, which would include the United States, Canada, and eighteen Western European countries.⁴⁴⁾ On January 11, 1961, he expressed his unwavering commitment to this vision to W. Harriman.

"If, in the near future, we begin to really organize the West, heading in the direction that NATO already represents, then, we will have made progress—already the European Communities, the growing integration of the Six represent the major factor of “change”. [...] In my opinion, there is no choice; the question has to be dealt with by America and Europe together."⁴⁵⁾

At the same time, Monnet harbored concerns regarding de Gaulle's notion of 'continental Europe', fearing its potential to distance Europe from the United States. He argued against addressing European defense matters outside of NATO and instead advocated for its reinforcement. Monnet emphasized the idea of an 'Atlantic Europe', highlighting the importance of military and economic partnerships with America. While Monnet envisioned a strong and independent Europe, he did not support the idea of united Europe maintaining neutrality between the blocs. He firmly rejected the notion of constructing Europe as an independent third force.⁴⁶⁾ Instead, he consistently emphasized the importance of solidarity between the United States and a united Europe. As a result, the early 1960s brought to light a significant clash between two divergent visions: 'continental Europe' versus 'Atlantic

43) FJME AMK 103/1/16: Une ère nouvelle dans les relations atlantiques (27.07.59).

44) Pierre Gerbet, "Jean Monnet-Charles de Gaulle : Deux conceptions de la construction européenne," in Gérard Bossuat and Andreas Wilkens, *Jean Monnet*, p.418.

45) FJME AMK C 23/4/177: Lettre de Jean Monnet à W. Harriman (11. 01.61).

46) FJME AMI 4/3/6: Lettre de Jean Monnet à René Pleven (03.09.50).

Europe.' This conflict revolved around the fundamental nature of the envisioned Europe, particularly its European identity. The disparities between their approaches proved to be insurmountable. The Gaullists accused Monnet of being influenced by his American connections, while Monnet criticized Gaullist policy for its self-centeredness. Their divergent perspectives during the 1960s reflected a profound clash between two fundamentally incompatible conceptions of European construction.⁴⁷⁾

The issue of British participation in the EEC was the conflict that crystallized tensions between de Gaulle and Monnet. Monnet desired England's engagement in the Common Market, while de Gaulle categorically rejected it. In this regard, despite all his efforts to reconcile their differences, Monnet ultimately distanced himself from de Gaulle, who could not share his optimism. Monnet confided in Allen Dulles about this matter:

"I am certain you were as delighted as I was that the British are now ready to join the European Common Market. The unity of Europe and its association with the United States seem to me the only policy to follow."⁴⁸⁾

Indeed, right from the beginning, Monnet firmly believed that British involvement would play a pivotal role in advancing European integration and fostering an Atlantic partnership.⁴⁹⁾ Recognizing the significance of British involvement, Monnet traveled to London to discuss the Schuman Plan with British officials. And during his presidency in Luxembourg in 1952, Monnet actively advocated for a strong partnership between the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the United Kingdom. He placed great emphasis on

47) Pierre Gerbet, "Jean Monnet-Charles de Gaulle. Deux conceptions de la construction européenne," in Gérard Bossuat et Andreas Wilkens, *Jean Monnet*, p.411.

48) FJME AMK C/23/3/162 : Lettre de Jean Monnet à Allen Dulles (01.09.61).

49) FJME AMG 5/1/6: Position anglaise et française (29.06.50); FJME AMG 5/1/5: Note de réflexion de Jean Monnet (03.05.50) [note confidentielle].

establishing a close and cooperative relationship between these two entities. Continuously, in 1955, he convinced the British to join the Common Market, viewing it as the most effective means to further European integration and strengthen the Atlantic partnership. Because, Monnet considered the inclusion of Britain in the European Community as a vital step in achieving an Atlantic Community and strengthening cooperation within the broader Atlantic context.⁵⁰⁾ British participation in the EEC was regarded by Monnet as an essential milestone in the journey toward integrating an Atlantic Community. In June 1961, he stated at Harvard:

"Britain is gradually coming to the conclusion that it should join the general movement towards European unity and the Common Market. As for your country, the prospect of a strong, united Europe emerging in Europe from the traditional divisions of the Continent, has convinced it that a partnership between Europe and the United States is necessary and possible. [...] The creation of a united Europe brings this nearer by making it possible for America and Europe to act as partners on an equal footing."⁵¹⁾

In this speech, he emphasized also that:

"[...] today, all our problems go beyond national frontiers. The issues raised by nuclear weapons, the underdeveloped areas, the monetary stability of our countries, and even their trade policies, all require joint action by the West. What is necessary is to move towards a true Atlantic Community in which common institutions will be increasingly developed to meet common problems. [...] It is evident that we must soon go a good deal further toward an Atlantic Community"⁵²⁾

50) FJME AMH 71/2/8 : Lettre de Jean Monnet à un Ambassadeur (18.10.52).; Francois Duchêne, Jean Monnet, p.325.; Eric Roussel, *Jean Monnet* (Fayard, 1996), p.769; Klaus Schwabe, "Jean Monnet, les Etats-Unis et le role de l'Europe au sein de la Communauté atlantique," in Gérard Bossuat and Andreas Wilkens, *Jean Monnet*, pp.291-293.

51) LC/FF(Félix Frankfurter Papers, Library of Congress) 33, Felix Frankfurter Papers, Monnet, Jean (1959-1964), speech : Harvard University Graduation, June, 1961.

Monnet's key concept regarding the Atlantic partnership was that the construction of Europe should be carried out in conjunction with the United States, with the aim of strengthening the Western world. He firmly believed that progress towards an Atlantic community was crucial. This idea resonated strongly with President Kennedy, as indicated by a letter from McGeorge Bundy, an American academic who served as the U.S. National Security Advisor to Presidents John F. Kennedy, demonstrating Kennedy's keen interest in the concept.

"I have noticed in particular the resolutions to which you direct attention. I can assure you that the President will be much interested in these resolutions and grateful to you for sending them forward."⁵³⁾

As a result, Monnet and the Kennedy government shared a crucial understanding. They both believed that the integration of Great Britain into the EEC was a vital prerequisite to achieve European unity and pave the way for a balanced Atlantic community. This vision aimed to be realized through a partnership between Europe and the United States, as outlined in Kennedy's ambitious 'Grand Design'. In a speech delivered in Philadelphia on July 4, 1962, to commemorate the Declaration of Independence, Kennedy stated:

"We do not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival but as a partner. Assisting in its progress has been a fundamental objective of our foreign policy for 17 years. We believe that a united Europe will be capable of playing a greater role in common defense, responding more generously to the needs of poorer nations, collaborating with the United States and other countries in reducing trade barriers, resolving currency and commodity problems, and developing coordinated policies in all other economic, diplomatic, and political

52) LC/FF 33, Monnet, Jean (1959-1964), speech: Harvard University Graduation, June, 1961.

53) JFK(John F. Kennedy Papers, Kennedy Library) 2, White House Central Main File, Monnet, Box 1918, Letter (McGeorge Bundy to Jean Monnet), Resolutions of the Action Committee (26, 07, 61)

areas. We see in such a Europe a partner with whom we can engage on an equal footing in all the major and weighty tasks involved in the building and defense of a community of free nations."⁵⁴⁾

However, de Gaulle's opposition posed a significant challenge to the realization of this project. He believed that Kennedy's 'grand design' was an American ambition aimed at maintaining its dominance over Europe and the world. Above all, de Gaulle doubted the possibility of achieving equality between Europe and the United States. Gérard Bossuat asserts that Monnet firmly believed in equal relations between Europe and the United States,⁵⁵⁾ while de Gaulle had doubts about it. The Gaullists criticized Monnet, claiming that he wanted to create an Atlantic community that could potentially lead to Europe losing its independence, influenced by his connections with Americans. In response to these criticisms, Pascaline Winand, an American historian, argued that Monnet recognized the importance of cooperation and partnership with the United States but maintained a primary focus on strengthening and unifying Europe.⁵⁶⁾ In a conversation with Eugene V. Rostow, an American legal scholar and politician, Monnet expressed the belief that "a self-aware Europe, with a strong sense of responsibility and capable of functioning as a true partner of America, is the only Europe that can achieve Atlantic unity."⁵⁷⁾ Therefore, it would be inaccurate to depict Monnet, as the Gaullists claimed, as someone who disregarded the significance of Europe's independence and was influenced by the United States.

54) FJME AMK 106/1/5: L'Amérique et l'Europe partenaires égaux. Un programme économique, de l'institut Atlantique, mars en 1963.

55) Gérard Bossuat, "Jean Monnet et le partenariat atlantique des années soixante," *Relations internationales*, No. 119, (automne 2004), p.285.

56) Pascaline Winand, "De l'usage de l'Amérique par Jean Monnet," in Gérard Bossuat et Andreas Wilkens, *Jean Monnet*, p.225.

57) Monnet à Gene rostow, 18 janvier 1961, Achieves Max Kohnstamm(MKD), cite in Pascaline Winand, "De l'usage de l'Amérique par Jean Monnet," in Gérard Bossuat et Andreas Wilkens, *Jean Monnet*, p.225.

IV. Conclusion

Both de Gaulle's Europe and Monnet's Europe were driven by a common vision of constructing Europe in a way that would protect and advance French interests. Despite their differing approaches, their ultimate objective was to establish a Europe that would protect and promote French interests. Recognizing this common vision enhances our understanding of their contributions to European integration and the complex dynamics that influenced their visions of Europe. However, significant disparities emerged between them in terms of how to construct Europe. They diverged significantly in their approaches to methods, institutions, and relationships with the United States. In essence, while both recognized the importance of European unity in maintaining peace, addressing the 'German Problem,' and positioning Europe between the American and Soviet superpowers, they differed significantly in their perspectives on European identity and the European dimension.

De Gaulle's conception of Europe can be summarized into three main categories. Firstly, he advocated for a Europe composed of independent states without a supranational authority. Secondly, he sought a Europe that maintained independence from the United States. And thirdly, he envisioned a Europe where France held a dominant role in foreign policy. De Gaulle proposed a highly ambitious European design, yet it was excessively focused on France, making it unacceptable to his partners primarily because it primarily served the interests of France. On the other hand, Monnet's conception of Europe can be characterized by three main categories. Firstly, he promoted a Europe that transcended narrow nationalism and was based on the principles of equality among nations. Secondly, he emphasized the importance of concrete institutions to drive European integration. Lastly, Monnet envisioned a Europe with a strong partnership between the European Community and the United States. Monnet sought to establish a closer transatlantic partnership, but he did not want a partnership in which Europe was influenced and subordinated by the United States. However, as Pierre Gerbet also notes, this vision

was considered unrealistic.⁵⁸⁾

Among these differences, the core disagreement revolved around the nature of the relations between Western Europe and the United States and the concept of Atlanticism in the 1960s. The conflicts between de Gaulle and Monnet went beyond the mere contrast between de Gaulle's vision of a Europe based on national identities and Monnet's belief in the benefits of supranationalism. While Monnet aimed to create an 'Atlantic Europe' that would encompass Britain and establish a Europe capable of standing on equal ground with the United States and collaborating on global issues, de Gaulle's approach had a different focus. His policies were driven by a desire for an independent Europe, free from American influence, and aimed at preserving France's sovereignty and asserting its interests within the European context. These differences often resulted in conflicts not only between the two leaders during the 1960s but also particularly concerning the Europe-United States relationship.

58) Pierre Gerbet, « Jean Monnet-Charles de Gaulle. Deux conceptions de la construction européenne », in Gérard Bossuat et Andreas Wilkens, *Jean Monnet*, p.411.

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〈국문초록〉

같은 꿈, 다른 야망: 1960년대 샤를르 드골의 유럽과 장 모네의 유럽

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드골과 모네의 유럽 개념을 비교하는 본 연구는 유럽건설에 대한 그들의 공유된 열망과 차이를 밝히는 데 주된 연구의 목적을 두고 있다. 거의 동시대를 살았던 두 인물은 20세기 초 국제 관계에서 중요한 역할을 했던 반면, 그들의 묘사는 종종 상반된 모습으로 그려지고 있다. 유럽통합과 관련하여 두 인물에 대한 일반적인 서사는 주로 차이와 갈등에 초점이 맞추어져 있고, 전자는 민족주의자로 후자는 ‘유럽통합의 아버지’로 강력히 대조되고 있다. 하지만 간과해서는 안 될 것이 드골과 모네가 모두 ‘강한 프랑스를 전제로 한 강력한 유럽 건설의 꿈’을 공유했다는 사실이다. 드골과 모네는 유럽의 평화를 유지하고, 제2차 세계 대전 후 ‘독일 문제’를 해결하며, 강하고 독립적인 유럽을 만들기 위해 유럽통합이 필요하다는 점을 함께 인식했다. 그러나 그들은 유럽을 건설하는 방법, 유럽의 제도 및 미국과의 관계에 있어서 큰 차이를 보였다. 이러한 차이로 인해 두 리더 간에는 종종 갈등이 발생했는데 특히, 1960년대 영국의 EEC 가입문제와 유럽-미국 관계에서 문제가 크게 두드러졌다. 드골의 유럽과 모네의 유럽을 비교하는 본 연구는 드골과 모네의 유럽 통합에 대한 공헌과 기여를 구체적으로 설명하고, 각각의 유럽 비전에 영향을 미친 복잡한 동기와 야망을 구체적으로 밝히고자 한다.

주제어: 유럽통합, 샤를르 드골, 장 모네, 초국가성, 대서양주의

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