

# The EU–South Korean Strategic Partnership: Normative Objectives in Mind\*

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## 〈Abstract〉

There is a conventional view that the effect of the EU and South Korean strategic partnership, which is a key foreign policy instrument, is more apparent than real. Realists ascribe its ineffectiveness to its thin institutionalization, the lack of common interests, and the increasing normative diversity. Such a realist argument, however, fails to capture the ideational aspect of the strategic partnership argument, particularly if it is also posited as a social space where the EU in particular is able to engage in normative role to assert its identity and to enhance its status and prestige in international society. Not least when the EU reflexively seeks to represent itself as a ‘normative’ power in international society, it is also both possible and relevant to interpret, if not analyze, the normative implications of the EU’s identity logics for the initiation and the overall governance of strategic partnership. This paper thus identifies, dissects, and examines the ways in which, and the extent to which, its self-narrative as opposed to their materialist interests has affected the underpinning logics and its discursive practices of strategic partnership, which has been pursued based on trade and investment, a framework participation agreement, and the crisis management operations.

**Keywords:** EU, South Korea, Strategic Partnership, Normative Power

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I. Introduction

The end of the Cold war justified both the internal and external pressure that called for the refurbishment of the European Community (EC). While the main focus of the EC was on the economic dimension, and appeared not to represent its member states' interests adequately, a new form of polity proved to be desperate. A transformed entity, the so-called European Union (EU), replacing the previous role of the EC, has committed itself to a wider range of issues, commensurate with its elevated status in world politics. Not only did it devote itself to economic issues, but to the areas of politics and security. It is against this backdrop that the Common and Foreign Security policy (CFSP) was adopted as the second pillar that constructs the EU as it stands today. Although there was a consensus that the Union-level foreign policy is necessary, and even inevitable, the EU could not develop its own framework from the outset of adopting the concept of the CFSP. Over time, however, as the EU's external relationship has been extended and more inclusive, so there was an internal demand to create its own template. It is under these circumstances that the idea of strategic partnership was proposed and finally chosen as its main foreign policy instrument.

When the EU-Korea strategic partnership was discussed under these circumstances, there was a sort of belief that it could open a new opportunity of cooperation. Despite such an initial ambition, however, we can hardly ignore a lingering question that problematizes its effectiveness. This kind of skepticism is not

something new, but old one. Grevi, for example, cast a deep doubt on its effects.<sup>1)</sup> He argued that while the issues the strategic partnership addresses are normally concerned with economic cooperation, the scope of cooperation would inevitably turn out to be limited. Renard also echoed his view, specifically elaborating the reasons of its effectiveness. He ascribed the inherent limitations of strategic partnership to its thin institutionalization, the lack of common interests of the parties concerned, and the increasing normative diversity.<sup>2)</sup>

Such a realist argument, however, does not seem to accurately reflect the true value of strategic partnership. If it is posited as a social space where both the EU and South Korea are able to engage in role-playing to assert their respective international identities and to enhance their status and prestige in international society,<sup>3)</sup> and if it is thus considered to allow the EU to reflexively represent itself as a ‘normative’ power in international society,<sup>4)</sup> we are then prompted to reevaluate its contribution, albeit ideational in nature. As Vahl argues, it would in fact make us aware of both the importance and relevance of normative discourse in this world.<sup>5)</sup> More specifically, if it helps us to understand the value and ideas, which makes the world different from the one that we, for example, experienced during the Cold-War era, we are then granted with new opportunities which seem to be urgent, but at the same time commonsensical. It is to this that the EU make its own contribution, as it has taken good advantage of a social space created within the framework of strategic partnership.<sup>6)</sup> If so, it is imperative to examine the

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- 1) Giovanni Grevi, “Making EU Strategic Partnerships Effective,” *Documentos de Trabajo FRIDE*, No.105 (2010), pp. 1–21.
  - 2) Thomas Renard, “The Treachery of Strategies: A Call for True EU Strategic Partnerships,” *Egmont Paper 45* (Royal Institute for International Relations, 2011).
  - 3) Jonathan Holslag, “The Elusive Axis: Assessing the EU-China Strategic Partnership,” *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.49, No.2 (2011), pp.293–313.
  - 4) Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: a Contradiction in Terms?,” *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.40, No.2 (2002), pp.235–258.
  - 5) Marisu Vahl, “Just Good Friends? The EU-Russian ‘Strategic Partnership’ and the Northern Dimension,” *CEPS Working Document*, No.166 (2001).

normative implications the EU-Korea strategic partnership would have, as well as how it would also affect the EU's efforts to consolidate its normative identity, i.e., the ability to shape what is normal in world politics. Keeping this assumption in mind, this paper aims to investigate how normative discourse operates within the framework of strategic partnership, and how it would also in turn justify the EU's self-narratives on which it has constructed its own self-identity.

The next section (Section Two) delves into the very definition of strategic partnership, by also examining what kinds of implications it has for the discussion of normative power Europe. Section Three delves into the distinguishable but also mutually reinforcing processes of realizing strategic partnership, and the extent to which the EU is able to represent itself as a normative power, specifically examining the three pillars of its partnership. For this, the section specifically investigates the implications associated with the start of Free Trade Agreement between the EU and Korea, the implementation of Framework Agreement, and the Crisis Management Participation Agreement. Section Four concludes the whole argument, summarizing the findings and implications of the paper.

## II. The Strategic Partnership and the EU

The concept of strategic partnership surfaced in 1995 when the common foreign and security policy was adopted as the second pillar of the EU. The inauguration of the EU system led the Union to adopt and institutionalize a new foreign policy instrument. It is this institutionalized framework that has also structured the EU's external relationship. Yet, there was no specific title nor the concept that properly represents such foreign policy practices. Even if the term strategic partnership was

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6) Anna Michalski and Zhongqi Pan, "Role Dynamics in a Structural Relationship: The EU-China Strategic Partnership," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.55, No.3 (2017), pp.611-627.

officially used when the EU established its formal relationship with Russia in 1998,<sup>7)</sup> there appeared to be no particular meanings or formality attached. Despite such ambiguities in terms of concept, however, the strategic partnership of the EU has been developed with two objectives in mind.

The first is to fulfill its material interests. It is indeed one of the EU's undeniable concerns. This is perhaps why the first partners it choose to work with were its traditional allies: the US and Canada, its first partners, must have had many things in common. Therefore, their partnership has evolved, concentrating on issues of how to address non-tariff barriers, how to converge national laws and regulations, and how to cope with long-term economic growth and jobs. Although the EU's relationship with the US was not specifically called as strategic partnership at that time, it was the first of its kind in hindsight.

The partnership of the EU went beyond its traditional allies. The former Communist countries were also strategically chosen as new partners to work with by the end of the Cold War. China and Russia, among others, were invited for strategic cooperation. When the EU established its formal relationship with Russia in 1988, the term strategic partnership was also officially used for the first time,<sup>8)</sup> thereby allowing them a new window of opportunity, while making them more committed to increased market access opportunities and fair competition and cooperation in investment and economic development.

On the other hand, it is also worth noting the normative intention embodied in the EU' treaties and how it in turn impacts the overall development of strategic partnership. As a treaty-based entity, the EU has been expressing its will and commitment to normative convergence with partner countries, with its target being more inclusive, and with a due attention to diverse issues of global concern.<sup>9)</sup> It

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7) European Council, VIENNA EUROPEAN COUNCIL 11 AND 12 DECEMBER 1998, Presidency Conclusions, 1998.

8) Tom Casier, "The EU-Russia Strategic Partnership: Challenging the Normative Argument," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol.65, No.7 (September 2013), pp.1377-1395.

was well reflected in the Foundation Articles 21 and 22 of TEU. These articles specifically articulated the normative feature of the Union-level foreign policy, as well as their implications for strategic partnership, by stipulating that

The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional and global organizations which share the principles of democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.<sup>10)</sup>

Here, we can see how normative discourse has been articulated, and how it has also been used in structuring the overall direction of strategic partnership. Such a tradition of stressing the normative commitment of the EU's foreign policy continued. The Lisbon Treaty that strengthened the political institutionalization of the EU reiterated its normative views and commitment in its external relations. It noted that the essential criterion to choose strategic partnership should depend on the question of whether partnership countries meet the EU's normative ambition so that they could keep their normative convergence (the Articles 21 and 22 of the Lisbon treaty).<sup>11)</sup>

As such, there is an ample evidence of normative discussion in the overall development trajectory of the EU in general and its foreign policy in particular. Yet, what is more important is that if the practice of its strategic partnership is carefully examined, we could hardly miss the co-constitutive relationship between strategic partnership and the EU's self-identification process. This means that the EU's

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9) Jonathan Holslag, "The Elusive Axis: Assessing the EU-China Strategic Partnership," p.295.

10) Official Journal of the European Union, 2008, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (May 9, 2008), pp.8-29.

11) Official Journal of the European Union, Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty of European Union and The Treaty establishing the European Community, EN, (2007/C 306/01).

strategic partnership could be seen as one of its discursive foreign policy practices, if it helps particular security meanings to be produced, and particular identity to be constituted.<sup>12)</sup> If so, strategic partnership can be assumed as a venue in which the EU engages in role-playing to assert its international identities and enhance its status and prestige as a global actor.<sup>13)</sup>

At this juncture, there are two more issues to be elaborated before we turn to the actual case study. It is first necessary to choose what kinds of the EU identity are to be employed and what kinds of its features are going to be referred to in order to assess its normativeness. As a matter of fact, there are intense debates in terms of the EU's self-identity,<sup>14)</sup> but it is still hard to determine which is most persuasive as far as the EU's collective identity is concerned. Despite such a variation and ambiguities, however, the focus here is not to discuss its self-identity anew, but to illuminate common features they would all agree as component elements making the EU distinctive in this post-Westphalian world order. This preliminary study is critical in order to assess whether, and the way in which, the EU is able to represent its normative values and ideas in world politics. To this objective, the first question is what is its normative feature. Of others, the paper concentrates on its normative ability to "shape what passes for normal in world politics".<sup>15)</sup> It generates interesting epistemological implications. First, it provides an insight in terms of why the EU entertains as the basis of its foreign policy, as well

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12) For more discussion about foreign policy practices and identity formation, see David Campbell, "Poststructuralism", T. Dunne, M. Kurki and S. Smith, eds., *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, (Oxford University Press, 2016), p.208.

13) Anna Michalski and Zhongqi Pan, "Role Dynamics in a Structural Relationship," p.612.

14) Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: a Contradiction in Terms?"; Ian Manners, "The Normative Ethics of the European Union," *International Affairs*, Vol.84, No.1 (2008) pp.45–60; Thomas Diez, "Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering 'Normative Power Europe'," *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, Vol.33, No.3 (2005), pp.613–636.

15) Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: a Contradiction in Terms?" p.253.

as its strategic partnership practices, such universal norms and values as human rights, liberal democracy, the rule of law, and the like within the framework of its strategic partnership.<sup>16)</sup>

Second, and equally important, it also illuminates the methodological differences of the EU in diffusing its norms and values as well as how all this is also perceived as normal in today's world politics. Unlike the US, which also claims itself as a normative power, the EU is different, because the methods it relies on are civilian in nature. While the US would use military forces if it feels it necessary, the EU instead puts an emphasis on dialogue and engagement as its foreign policy methods. This is in a sense a reflexive representation of its deontological ethics, one of the core ethics defining the EU as a different kind of actor – be it a normative, ethic, civilian or even civilizing one.<sup>17)</sup> If so, it is how the EU is able to essentialize self with those that tend to display normative divergence, and it is also how it prevents itself from being too much self-righteous once again.

In fact, the EU attempts to expel the negative image of its past Other, whose foreign policy was marked by self-seeking egoistic statecraft that resulted in horrible confrontations and wars.<sup>18)</sup> So, the EU has intentionally and characteristically focused more on non-traditional security issues, rather than national security. It is also for the same reason why the EU has endeavored to come to terms with modern-form state, by presenting an alternative form of so-called post-modern polity, which does no longer seem to be entrapped by the impulse of re-nationalization. If so, examining the way in which strategic partnership is practiced with Korea could also shed light on how the EU has been able to project its self-image as a 'force for good' or at least a contributor to world order through the use of its normative power.<sup>19)</sup>

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16) Thomas Diez, "Europe's Others and the Return of Geopolitics," *Cambridge Review of International Studies*, Vol.17, No.2 (2004), pp.319-335.

17) Manners, "The Normative Ethics of the European Union," pp.57-58.

18) Diez, "Constructing the Self and Changing Others," p.634.

19) Michael Smith and Huaxian Xie, "The European Union and China: The Logics of



### III. Three Pillars of Strategic Partnership

The EU and South Korea are geographically remote and strategically indifferent, and may not see each other as a critical stakeholder for each other's affairs. But they are still perceived to each other as a potential, but also important, partner for cooperation in the future, given their commitment to democracy, a market economy, human rights and the rule of law. Such a basic commonality has indeed bound them as like-minded countries in their views and objectives specifically in terms of how the post-Cold War era has to evolve. Given such a bondage, their relationship has decades of history and could also be interpreted as strategic in nature. Their relationship has been based on their mutual commitment to cooperation in economic, political and societal areas – even before the bilateral relationship was upgraded to a strategic partnership in 2010.

The primary focus for cooperation has been the economic area. Given the basic position of the EU, which was clearly spelled out in its New Strategy towards Asia Strategy that ensuring stability and prosperity in Asia would be beneficial for the EU in the long run,<sup>20)</sup> the EU's focus on the economic relationship seems to be understandable, and also consequential. It is this rationale that has underpinned the bilateral economic relationship. The economic relationship has been developed within a framework of trade agreement. The first specific step taken was to sign the Agreement on Cooperation and Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters in 1997. It was then followed by the Framework Agreement on Trade and Cooperation Agreement. When it was enacted in 2001, it helped enhance cooperation specifically in areas of transport, energy, environment and the like. As their cooperation became further widened and deepened, the institutional framework

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‘Strategic Partnership’,” *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, Vol.6, No.4 (2010), p.435.

20) Commission of the EU, “Toward a New Asia Strategy,” COM(1994) 314 final, Brussels (July 13, 1994).

guiding their relationship has deserved further refurbishment, and it was in 2010 that both parties thus agreed to the Free Trade Agreement, the most recent form of institution underpinning their economic relations. Not only has it indeed underpinned and guided their economic relationship, but it has also even provided a direct impetus to the extent that their relationship can be upgraded to a strategic partnership.

There is also a political cooperation. It is an integral part of strategic partnership, which also makes their bilateral relationship more inclusive in terms of its scope and implications. It was back in 1995 when the EU's political engagement in Korean affairs was first initiated. The EU's participation in the KEDO program as an executive member was a case in point. The EU, addressing the North Korean nuclear issue in a multilateral framework, aimed to exert its own political influence in the region.<sup>21)</sup> It was the first political engagement recorded in the EU-Korean relationship. Despite its ambitious start, the KEDO program soon proved to be a failure. Nevertheless, the EU continued to pressure North Korea to give up its weapons of mass destructions such as nuclear weapons. It was the Framework Agreement that has led their bilateral cooperation in the political area, developing multiple channels to tackle a diverse range of issues of a bilateral concern. In addition to the focus on hard-security issues, soft-security issues have also been subject to discussion, ranging from sustainable development, science, technology, education to culture. Under the circumstances, the upgrade of relations between the EU and the Republic of Korea to a strategic partnership in 2010 could be said to have enhanced their level of commitment for a wider scope for cooperation, while widening the room for further development of their bilateral relationship.

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21) Moosung Lee, "The EU and Six-Party Talks," C. Nicola. ed., *Promoting Security Cooperation and Trust Building in Northeast Asia: The Role of the European Union* (Nuova Cultura, 2017), pp.169-180.

## 1. Economic Pillar

Both the EU and Korea see each other as an important economic partner. It is true in a sense, given that the EU is Korea's third largest export market while Korea is the EU's eighth largest export destination for goods. Since the agreement of FTA, EU exports of goods to South Korea increased by 77% from 2010 to 2018. EU exports of services to South Korea increased by 82%, compared to 66% for EU imports from the country, from 2010 to 2017. Over the same 2010-2017 period, EU inward foreign direct investment stocks also increased by 112% and EU outward FDI stocks (EU investments in Korea) increased by 39%.<sup>22)</sup>

What makes all this possible is the free trade agreement enforced since 2010. While the EU-Korea FTA is now perceived as a main framework into which their economic relationship is anchored, it became subject to negotiations from the mid-2000s. Before the mid-2000s, the idea of EU-Korea FTA did not seem to be feasible, simply because the Union was not ready to adopt extensive FTAs. The FTAs it signed with were the ones that used to be its member states' former colonies. This policy line, however, could not be sustainable. Not least when the wave of globalization was high particularly with the end of Cold-War, and, more specifically, with former Communist countries also jumping into its bandwagon, there was a mounting call for further liberalization of its trade with third countries.

Under these circumstances, the rise of Asia, particularly that of South Korea, drew the EU's attention, and it was by the issuance of Global Europe communication in 2006 that there was finally institutional ground created for the EU to take a more aggressive attitude towards outsiders. The 2006 communication indeed led the EU to consider FTAs with third countries more seriously, assuming it as a right pathway to secure its own interests and even its own survival in an

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22) European Commission, "Countries and Regions: South Korea," <https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/south-korea/> (검색일: 2020. 6. 1).

increasingly globalized world.<sup>23)</sup> The negotiation for the EU-Korea FTA was started against this backdrop and became enforced since 2011. As the first and new generation of agreement, it finally enforced both parties to treat each other as important trade partners: South Korea has been able to get access to a freer EU market with a new opportunity; whereas the EU could take full advantage of its large market potential, while easing trade barriers caused by its high level of protection with respect to imports from EU.<sup>24)</sup> The logic of economic benefits appears to be powerful in making sense of the bilateral economic relationship, but it does not necessarily explain all the motives and logics working behind the scenes. What has to be focused on from now on is to investigate how a normative discourse is also at play in this relationship.

To reinterpret the EU-Korea FTA from the normative perspective, it is first necessary to examine how the normative cause was embodied and represented in the decision-making and enforcement processes of the EU-Korea FTA. In 2008, for example, there was a financial crisis, and it was for this that the EU also appeared to be pressed hard to adopt a protectionist stance. Under these circumstances, undesirably, the negotiations for FTA were underway. On appearance, the negotiation did not seem to be easy, not least when there was a concern that the future FTA could undermine the competitiveness of the EU's member states' car industry, such as Italy. This was not groundless concern, given Korea's competitiveness in the manufacture of small-sized cars.<sup>25)</sup> In hindsight, such a concern could have made the negotiation itself stalled and difficult, if not derailed it entirely, but both the EU and Korea were nevertheless agreed to sign the FTA

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23) European Commission, "Global Europe: Competing in the World. A Contribution to the EU's Growth and Jobs Strategy. COM(2006) 567 final," <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0567:FIN:en:PDF> ( : 2020. 5. 1).

24) *Ibid.*, pp.8-10.

25) Gabriel Siles-Brügge, "Resisting Protectionism after the Crisis: Strategic Economic Discourse and the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement," *New Political Economy*, Vol.16, No.5 (2011), pp.627-653.

agreement eventually. What made them reach an agreement was of course not solely due to their short-term calculations of their material interests, but also to their shared understanding of the importance of trade liberalization.<sup>26)</sup> Both parties were indeed well aware that the FTA would be not only instrumental but also appropriate in laying the institutionalized groundwork for the further liberalization of trade. This is what trade liberalism is all about, as regional trade agreements is argued to act as a stepping stone for trade liberalization at a global level.<sup>27)</sup> If that is the case, and more interestingly, the EU is also able to justify its self-identity as a normative power as it adopts and diffuses the value which is considered as normal and appropriate from the global norms and standards.

Not only does the EU-Korea FTA act as a stimulator in diffusing the universal norm of trade liberalism, thereby generating an opportunity in which the EU's normative identity could be reflexively represented and reaffirmed, but it has also affected our way of thinking in terms of how potential regional conflicts revolving around the Korean peninsula could be addressed peacefully through the regional (economic) cooperation. If the EU-Korea FTA provides a preliminary venue and template within which to evaluate and assess the way in which and the extent to which the spillover effects of cooperation from area of low politics to that of high politics could be successfully experimented,<sup>28)</sup> we could get some normative implications and insights. To be sure, to make this concept operationalizable, there are some preconditions to be met such as whether the parties concerned have similar forms of economic, political and social system, and have no issue of their compatibilities.<sup>29)</sup> Even so, what this implicates is that this very effort would further

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26) Ramon Pacheco Pardo, Linde Desmaele, Maximilian Ernst, "EU-ROK relations putting the strategic partnership to work," *KFVUB KOREA Chair Report* (October, 2018), p.7.

27) John Ravenhill, "Regional Trade Agreements," John Ravenhill, ed., *Global Political Economy*, 5th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2017), p.165.

28) For a more discussion of this methods, see Moosung Lee and Diez Thomas, "Introduction," *Asia Europe Journal*, Vol.14, No.4 (2016) pp.353-366.

29) For more, see Chapter 3 of Michael Sheehan, *International Security: An Analytical Survey* (Lynne Rienner Pub, 2005).

increase the possibility for the regional-cooperation-and-regional-conflict nexus as a foreign policy option. If that is the case, we could also argue that the current form of economic relationship the EU has developed with South Korea could be reinterpreted as a strategic partnership for a normative purpose.

## 2. Political Pillar

The Framework Agreement between the EU and Korea is the first kind of agreement the Union signed with any Asian countries. Functioning as a comprehensive legal framework covering a wide spectrum of policy fields, the Agreement has set a prototype of political institution that helps invigorate dynamic bilateral cooperation. Although it is now commonly accepted as the main framework for bilateral relationship, it was not the case, when it was first proposed. It began with the Framework Agreement for Trade and Cooperation back in 1996. It had functioned as the basis for EC-Korea bilateral relations until it was replaced with an updated one in 2010. Forming the basis of economic and financial cooperation, the 1996 Agreement had its own particular significance, as it contained general guidelines and principles for political dialogues. And it was within this framework that both parties were anyway able to cooperate and agreed to nurture their shared values such as how to promote, for example, democratic principles and human rights as defined in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.<sup>30)</sup>

The 1996 Agreement soon became subject to revision. With the end of Cold War, new issues came to the fore. And the existing framework guiding their political relationship no longer seemed to be relevant to meet new challenges, and the existing Agreement was revised and signed in 2010, with its final enforcement in 2014.<sup>31)</sup> The new Framework Agreement also has a particular significance, as it

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30) Official Journal of the European Communities, FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT for Trade and Cooperation between the European Community and its Member States, on the one hand, and the Republic of Korea, on the other hand, L 90/46, EN, (March 30, 2001).

was negotiated in parallel with a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and also led both parties to form the basis for a strategic partnership with a coherent and modernized framework for bilateral relationship.

The aim of the Agreement is extensive. It deals with a wide range of issues of mutual concern. And both the EU and Korea have thus devoted themselves to the issues of human rights, free markets and multilateralism, as well as those of science and technology, education, climate change, and development assistance. By incorporating a wide range of issues into the parameters of bilateral discussion,<sup>32)</sup> the Agreement has also helped extend the room for the EU to act more actively at a regional and global stage.<sup>33)</sup> As the EU takes responses and actions of an inclusive nature in addressing global concerns, it is also able to show how it acts to reflect the interests of international society, not necessarily its narrow self-interests.<sup>34)</sup> It is here where we can also see how the EU seeks to consolidate its actorness in world politics, and also its distinctive self-identity as a normative power through these foreign policy practices. More specifically, engaging more actively in addressing new security issues such as human rights, climate change and development assistance signifies that its concern is both normative and appropriate. It is appropriate, as new agenda are incorporated into the parameters of discussion in this post-Westphalian world order.<sup>35)</sup> It is also normative, because paying

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31) Official Journal of the European Union, FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT between the European Union and its Member States, on the one part, and the Republic of Korea, on the other part, L 20/2, EN, (January 23, 2013).

32) Ramon Pacheco Pardo, Linde Desmaele, Maximilian Ernst, "EU-ROK relations putting the strategic partnership to work," p.26.

33) Jonathan Holslag, "The Elusive Axis: Assessing the EU-China Strategic Partnership," p.295.

34) Carmen-Cristina Cirlig, "EU Strategic Partnerships with Third Countries," Library Briefing, *Library of the European Parliament* (September 2012); "EU Strategic Partnerships with Third Countries," Library Briefing, *Library of the European Parliament* (September 2012). p.5.

35) This is largely because of the deepening and broadening of security issues in post-Cold War era, for more, see Barry Buzan, Ole Wver, and Jaap De Wilde,

attention to these issues and addressing them actively proves to be ‘new normalcy’ in today’s world politics. If so, this is how the EU is able to demonstrate its normative ability to shape what passes for normal in world politics.

The rule-based approach adopted in the Agreement also justifies the EU’s normative self in methodological terms. The rule-based approach basically stresses the importance of dialogues and engagement in dealing with global affairs. In line with such a tradition, the EU, with the help of Korea, has also attached itself to its habits of political dialogues through summits and high-level officer meetings, in which deliberative politics is possible. This is on the one hand a reflexive representation of its deontological ethics as a normative power, as this would entail the reasoning and rationalization of its external actions through processes of engagement and dialogue. It is also how it is able to ensure its own ontological security as a distinctive power – be it normative, ethical or even civilizing power – as the routines of deliberation reaffirms who it is.<sup>36)</sup> As Diez argues, this is how the EU identifies itself as a distinctive power, i.e., preferring civilian methods in addressing issues is indeed a consequence of self-reflection of its past Other, which was more likely to employ military forces, if it helps diffuse its ideas and values to others.<sup>37)</sup> But this approach is an anachronistic practice, not a normal one considered appropriate from the norms and standards of the post-Westphalian world. As a result, the methodology the EU promotes is well indicative of its self-identity. Promoting the principles of consensus, mutual respect, equal partnership, multilateralism, and respect for international law should not thus necessarily be seen as the demonstration of its incompetence, i.e., it has no other means to use, but on the contrary it should be understood as its normative commitment. If so, the commitment and actual practice to abide by such principles

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*Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Lynn Rienner, 1998).

36) Jennifer Mitzen, “Anchoring Europe’s Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities and Ontological Security,” *European Journal of Public Policy*, Vol.13, No.2 (2006), pp.270-285.

37) Thomas Diez, “Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering ‘Normative Power Europe,’” p.634.



suffice to confirm that the Framework Agreement also helps the EU consolidate its normative self-identity.

### 3. Security Pillar

Along with economic and political partnership, there was a demand to sign a separate Framework Agreement for the participation of Korea in EU Crisis Management Operation.<sup>38)</sup> The EU's crisis management operation is an integral part of its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). And the EU decided to establish an army corps of 50,000-60,000 troops at the Helsinki Council in 1999. This was how the CSDP had a direct impact on the improvement of its crisis management capabilities.<sup>39)</sup> Although its primary objective is for internal security cooperation, there has been a change in it, because of the growing role and expectation of the EU in world politics. It is for this reason that the EU's crisis management operation has developed in such a way to reflect the basic concepts of European Security Strategy, a guideline of the EU for its strategic objectives.<sup>40)</sup>

The need of the EU for security cooperation with Korea is also getting necessary and even urgent over time. Unlike the existing frameworks of political cooperation such as the Framework Agreement, which focuses on institutionalized dialogues, the Crisis Management Participation Agreement (CMPS) provides a concrete form of legal foundation so that Korea can participate in the EU-led crisis management operations. With the CMPS first signed in 2014 and coming into effect since 2016, both the EU and Korea have legitimacy to cooperate more closely in the fields of

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38) Official journal of the EU, AGREEMENT between the European Union and the Republic of Korea establishing a framework for the participation of the Republic of Korea in European Union crisis management operations, L 166/3, EN, (June 5, 2014).

39) Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, "The Strategic Culture of the European Union: A Progress Report," *International Affairs*, Vol.81, No.4 (2005), p.802.

40) European Council, *European Security Strategy: A secure Europe in a better world*, Brussels (December 12, 2003).

defense and military operations, which used to be intentionally avoided because they were too sensitive to be addressed within the framework of existing strategic partnership. Under these circumstances, and particularly with the operation of the CMPS, both parties carried out the military mission for counter-piracy operation under the aegis of the Atalanta Operation. While it was the only case of joint operation ever recorded, it was a monumental military mission in which both the Korean navy and European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Somalia acted together to protect vessels and to monitor fishing activities off the coast of Somalia.<sup>41)</sup> As this case of military mission for naval security indicates, it is the accommodation of the CMPS scheme that enables both parties to create and consolidate a security framework, which in turn helps address security issues of both regional and global concerns.

The main concern of the crisis management mission is to tackle global security issues through military engagement. If the objectives and area for focus are further scrutinized, however, there appears to be some civilian and even normative features.<sup>42)</sup> First, the EU seeks to foster a culture of prevention, while focusing on the process of post-conflict peace. Second, and more importantly, the main concern of the CMO is not to deal with traditional security alone, but more likely to cope with such non-traditional security issues as peace keeping operations or humanitarian operations. Above all, these operations are different from the military actions. This is largely because they include both military and civilian missions, such as policing, institutions building, and security sector reform, and the like, and it is not possible to directly link it with conventional form of military operations.

In addition, if we examine the method the EU prefers to use, we could also figure out how it attempts to represent its normative feature. Because the EU<sup>3)</sup> seeks to promote effective multilateralism through its crisis management operation,<sup>43)</sup> it

41) Pardo, Desmaele, and Ernst, "EU-ROK Relations Putting the Strategic Partnership to Work," p.5.

42) , 「 EU, JPI , 218 (2018), 4-5 .

decides the participation of third parties (here, South Korea). In evaluating the European Security Strategy, the basis of CMO, Mitzen argues, for example, that it is different from the traditional sense of foreign policy-making.<sup>44)</sup> Comparing the ESS with national security policy in particular, she points out their differences. When it comes to national foreign policy-making, states make their foreign policy-making on their own, and do not allow a group of states to produce a doctrine for them, as each has its own different strategic culture and may view its threat environments quite differently. But the crisis management operation based on effective multilateralism has its own implications, in that it enables the EU to have a deliberation with third parties so that participants express their different views and ways of addressing issues, even if all this would make their difference salient. Yet, it is through such a deliberation process that the EU is not only able to expel the impulses to renationalize, the source of the past tragedy, but to find a common position acceptable to all. If so, this process could also be understood as one ensuring effective multilateralism, a normative basis underpinning its own self-identity.

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43) Jolyon Howorth, "EU Global Strategy in a Changing World: Brussels' Approach to the Emerging Powers," *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol.37, No.3 (2016), p.391.

44) Jennifer Mitzen, "Anchoring Europe's Civilizing Identity: Habits, Capabilities and Ontological Security," pp.282-283.

## IV. Conclusion

It has been argued that the EU-Korea strategic partnership is a good example that shows how the Union's normative identity has reflexively been represented, while playing its designated role. As opposed to its critiques who have primarily focused on its inefficiency, and who thus failed to capture the normative dimension of strategic partnership, what we have attempted to argue here is that if the EU's foreign policy instrument is reinterpreted from the perspective of identity politics, the insights we can get would be quite different.

There are two implications worth noting. First, the EU has been committed itself to promoting a new foreign policy instrument. Unlike the traditional form of foreign policy instruments, such as alliance, the EU's strategic partnership has not necessarily dealt with military security: it has indeed contributed to opening up a new possibility in which a wide range of new non-traditional security issues could be brought onto key agenda. This is not just because they are important today, but also because it is what the EU has sought after. It is through such discursive practices that the EU has aimed at consolidating its normative identity, while imprinting that they are now passed for what is normal in terms of issues to be addressed. Second, and equally important, the way in which these issues have approached and addressed also proves to be normative in nature. As the effective multilateralism has been adopted as its basic rule for intergovernmental negotiations, so the way the EU deals with foreign affairs proves to be compatible with this principle. Instead of resorting to military forces by the name of civilizing mission, the EU has endeavored not to recall the nationalist mantra. Instead, the EU has attempted to apply new methods, such as dialogue and engagement, in dealing with foreign affairs, making it a new normal. This can also be seen as compatible with common-sensical practices of foreign policy in this post-Westphalian world order, in which the impulse to renationalize is gradually being expelled.

To be sure, it is important also not to underestimate the cooperative attitude on

the part of Korea to make all this feasible, but it is the will and drive of the EU that is at the heart of its operation should not go unappreciated. It is without its contribution and commitment that strategic partnership would not meet its original objective, nor is the EU able to maintain its self-narrative as a different kind of actor, one that vows to reborn as a novel kind of actor. It is for this reason that the case study of the EU-Korea strategic partnership could be seen as another case in point in which the EU's normative identity is reflexively represented.

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## 〈국문초록〉

## 한-EU 전략적 동반자 관계: 규범적 함의

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유럽연합의 주요 외교정책의 기제인 전략적 동반자 관계 중 한국과 유럽 연합에 대한 동반자 관계에 대한 평가는 엇갈리고 있다. 특히 현실주의자들은 전략적 동반자 관계의 가치를 폄하하는 입장을 견지하고 있다. 이들은 전략적 동반자 관계가 제도화가 제대로 되지 않아, 그 효율성도 담보할 수 없고, 그리고 참여자 간의 공동의 이해관계를 찾기 어렵고, 마지막으로 이들 간의 규범적 성향에 있어 이질성이 존재하기 때문이라고 보고 있다. 그러나 이런 논의는 동반자 관계의 관념적 요소가 지니는 가치를 제대로 이해하지 못한 결과라고 볼 수 있다. 사실 전략적 동반자 관계는 유럽연합과 같은 행위자들이 국제사회에서 규범적 권력과 같은 자신의 정체성을 발현하는데 있어 중요한 사회적 장으로 작동하는 순기능적 모습을 보이고 있다. 이에 본고는 유럽연합의 정체성이 전략적 동반자 관계 속에서 어떻게 구현되며, 그로 인해 전략적 동반자 관계가 어떻게 작동되는지를 고찰하는 것을 본 고의 주된 연구 목적으로 삼는다. 이를 위해, 본고는 한-유럽연합 동반자 관계의 경제, 정치, 및 안보 분야에서의 협력에 초점을 맞추어 본 논의를 진행하며, 그 과정에서 유럽연합의 정체성이 어떻게 공고히 되는지를 살펴본다.

**주제어:** 유럽연합, 한국, 전략적 동반자 관계, 규범적 권력

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